Abstract. In this article it is demonstrated that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision under asymmetric information may well lead to ex post efficiency if the default decision is non-trivial. It is argued that the default decision may be interpreted as a 'simple' contract that the parties have written ex ante. This result is used in order to show that simple unconditional contracts which are renegotiated may allow the hold-up problem to be solved, even if the parties' valuations are private information.
Introduction
This article considers a variant of a standard mechanism design problem.
There are n risk-neutral agents who have to make a collective decision q ∈ [0, 1]. The decision q =1is ex post efficient whenever the sum of the agents' valuations for an affirmative decision is positive, whereas q =0is ex post efficient otherwise. The agents posses private information on their independently distributed valuations. It is by now well known that ex post efficiency can be achieved in such a problem with quasi-linear utilities, if the parties can write a comprehensive contract ex ante; i.e., before they privately learn their types (see D'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet, 1979, and Arrow, 1979) .
In this paper it is assumed instead that ex ante the parties can only write a simple ('incomplete') contract which merely consists of an unconditional trade level q 0 ∈ [0, 1].
1 Can voluntary bargaining that starts after the parties have learned their valuations lead to ex post efficiency, given that the ex ante contract just specifies a default decision q 0 ?
The impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) says that given a non-trivial decision problem, in the case n =2ex post efficiency cannot be achieved if q 0 =0(which corresponds to no ex ante contract). For n>2, the impossibility result has been further strengthened by Güth and Hellwig (1986) . 2 In contrast, here it is argued that ex post efficiency may be achieved if q 0 6 =0. This paper is motivated by a major problem in contract theory. While optimal complete contracts are often quite complicated, real world contracts seem to be rather simple. 3 One possible explanation is the fact that even 1 In addition, the contract may specify a lump sum up-front payment.
2 See also Rob (1989) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) .
3 Cf. Hart and Holmström (1987) and Hart (1995) .
though simple contracts may often not be flexible enough to induce the first best directly, they may be efficient if they are renegotiated in a certain way (cf. Huberman and Kahn, 1988) . In particular, several recent papers have
shown that while the well-known hold-up problem can often be solved by sophisticated contracts (see Rogerson, 1992) , it may also be solved by simple contracts that just specify a threatpoint for future negotiations, given that the parties are symmetrically informed (cf. Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey, 1990 , Chung, 1991 , Nöldeke and Schmidt, 1995 , Edlin, 1996 , and Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996 . 4 This paper attempts to make a first exploratory step directed at a generalization of these insights to the case of private information.
The paper is organized as follows. The first result in Section 2 characterizes decision rules that can be implemented if the default decision is exogenously given by some value q 0 ∈ [0, 1]. The second result shows that in the case of identically distributed valuations, there is an easily interpreted default decision q 0 , such that ex post efficiency can be achieved for any number n of agents. The third result shows that in the setting of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) , ex post efficiency is always achievable if the default decision is chosen appropriately. In Section 3 it is argued that this insight can be folded back into a trading problem with ex ante investments to achieve the first best in a hold-up problem with private information. The results are further discussed in Section 4. All proofs have been relegated to the appendix.
Voluntary bargaining under asymmetric information
Consider n ≥ 2 risk-neutral agents indexed by i ∈ {1, ..., n}.Ac o l l e c t i v e decision q ∈ [0, 1] h a st ob er e a c h e d . I fa g e n ti receives t i dollars, his or her utility is given by v i q + t i , where Let the corresponding density function be denoted by f i (v i ). Assume that the default decision is given by q 0 ∈ [0, 1] ; i.e., there is an exogenously given 'constitution' (or a simple prior contract) which says that if the n agents do not reach a different agreement, the decision will be q 0 . Bargaining is assumed to be voluntary, such that an agreement to choose q 6 = q 0 can only be reached unanimously.
According to the revelation principle (cf. Myerson, 1982) , any Bayesian equilibrium outcome of any conceivable bargaining game among the n agents can also be obtained as the equilibrium outcome of a direct mechanism in which the agents report their types truthfully. Letṽ denote the vector
, where
It is assumed that a mechanism must satisfy the budget constraint P n i=1 t i (ṽ)=0∀ṽ. The parties can accept or reject the mechanism. If at least one party does not accept the mechanism, the default decision q 0 is implemented. Otherwise the parties announce their valuations and then the decision and transfer payments are determined by the mechanism.
] denote agent i's expected transfer, given that agent i reports v i and assuming that the other agents tell the truth. 5 If agent i tells the truth, his or her interim expected utility is given by
a mechanism to induce truthful reporting, it must be incentive compatible:
Definition 1 Ame chanism [q(v),t(v) ] is cal led Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if ∀i, ∀v i , ∀ṽ i :
Given that the other agents tell the truth, condition (1) guarantees that it is rational for agent i to also tell the truth. The following lemma, which is a standard application of mechanism design techniques, provides a very convenient characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms.
Lemma 1 Am e c h a n i s m[q(v),t(v)] is Bayesian incentive compatible if and
only if Q i (v i ) is non-decreasing for all i and ∀i, ∀v i , ∀ṽ i :
In particular, the lemma says that in a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism the interim expected utility U i (v i ) of agent i is uniquely determined (up to an integration constant) by the decision rule. Bargaining is voluntary, hence each agent can refuse to participate in the mechanism. Since non-participation of an agent leads to the decision q 0 which can also be prescribed by the mechanism itself, there is no loss of generality by restricting attention to mechanisms in which all types participate.
.., v n ) and E −i is the expectation operator with respect to
6 Note that in general this would not necessarily be the case if (instead of an ex ante fixed q 0 ) o n eo ft h ep a r t i e sw e r eg i v e nt h er i g h tt oc h o o s eq 0 ex post (cf. Klibanoff and Morduch, 1995) .
Definition 2 Ame chanism[q(v),t(v)] is called interim individually rational
if and only if ∀i, ∀v i :
The case that has received most attention in the literature is given by q 0 =0. In this case, participation of the lowest possible type (i.e., U i (a i ) ≥ 0 ∀i) is necessary and sufficient for (2). If q 0 =0, the type a i isthetypethatis worst-off from participating in a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism,
is a non-decreasing function (see Lemma 1). The following lemma generalizes this idea to the present setting where q 0 6 =0is possible.
individually rational if and only if ∀i
where w(q 0 ) satisfies q 0 = Q i (w(q 0 )).
Note that with q 0 6 =0, the lowest possible valuation does no longer need to be the worst-off type. For instance, if q 0 =1 , an agent with the highest possible valuation can lose the most from participating in the mechanism.
The following proposition provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a mechanism to be incentive compatible and individually rational, provided the exogenous default decision is given by q 0 ∈ [0, 1]. 
It may be useful to take a closer look at condition (3) . The term on the left hand side is the sum of all agents' interim expected utilities, given that they participate in a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism and provided they are of their worst-off types. Consider the case q 0 =0 .T h e nv 0 i = a i , and condition (3) becomes
If there were no private information, any q(v) such that P n i=1 v i q(v) ≥ 0 could obviously be part of an interim individually rational mechanism. In the presence of private information, this condition has to be expressed in expected values and modified such that the true valuation v i is replaced by the
, which is known as agent i's 'virtual valuation'. 8 It reflects t h ed istor tionin tr od u cedd u etoth efac tt h a tth ea ge n tsm u stbein d u ce dto report their valuations honestly. If the mechanism failed to account for this incentive effect, the agents were tempted to understate their valuations (in 7 This condition is known from Güth and Hellwig (1986) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) . 8 The 'virtual valuation' (cf. Myerson, 1981) appears in many related models where agents have private information about their willingness-to-pay. See Bulow and Roberts (1989) for an interesting economic interpretation of 'virtual valuations' and 'virtual costs'. other words, bias their reports towards the worst-off type, i.e., the lowest possible valuation, in order to decrease their payments). Analogously, in models in which agents have private information about their costs, 9 the 'virtual costs'
appears (where the true costs are given by v i ),r e flecting the factthatonemustinduceagentsnottooverstate their costs (the agents want to pretend to be of the worst-off type, i.e., have the highest possible costs, in order to receive a large compensation). In the present model, the incentives to understate and to overstate may be balanced, since with a default decision 0 <q 0 < 1, the worst-off type can occur at an intermediate valuation.
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It is worth noting that the proposition above applies to any decision rule q such that Q i is increasing for all i. There is one such decision rule which is of particular interest, namely the rule which maximizes total surplus.
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Definition 3 The ex post efficient decision rule q * (v) is given by
Hence, ex post efficiency can be achieved whenever (3) holds, where
While Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) showed that private information may render ex post efficiency unattainable, Rob (1989) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) suggest that in the case of many agents private information even leads to complete inertia; i.e., a move away from the status quo cannot be achieved without coercion. However, these negative results crucially depend on the implicit assumption that the default decision is given by q 0 =0 . If q 0 lies in the interior of the unit interval, there are non-trivial situations in which even ex post efficiency can be achieved for any number n of agents, as the following proposition illustrates.
Proposition 2 Consider the case F i = F ∀i and let the default decision be given by q 0 =P r n P
Then there exists a Bayesian incentive compatible, interim individually rational and ex post efficient mechanism.
Note that the default decision q 0 specified in the proposition has a straightforward interpretation. The default decision is such that if agent i does not participate, then he or she expects the decision to be what is efficient for the n − 1 other agents; i.e., when agent i's preferences are simply disregarded.
In this case, each agent is better off when he or she participates and in this w a ye xpo s te fficiency can be achieved.
Proposition 2 is closely related to the efficiency result of Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) . They also consider n agents with identically distributed valuations. However, their analysis concerns the dissolution of partnerships. Specifically, they show that ex post efficiency can be achieved if initially every agent holds a certain share of a good, when it is ex post efficient that only one agent possesses 100% of the good (namely, the agent with the highest valuation). Therefore, while they consider a private good setting, Proposition 2 illustrates that a result in a similar spirit can also be obtained in a public good setting, in which every agent must 'consume' the same amount q.
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In Section 3 a possible interpretation of endogenously chosen default decisions q 0 (namely, simple prior contracts) will be discussed in the framework of the hold-up problem. The following result will be particularly important for this discussion. Consider the bilateral trading problem of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) ; i.e. there is a buyer who is interested in a good that can be provided by a seller. Formally, let v 1 denote the buyer's valuation and −v 2 the seller's costs. The following proposition says that one can always find a level of trade q 0 such that ex post efficiency can be achieved. =0 . Some technical work is then needed to show that the sum of the agents' expected utilities given that they are of their worst-off t y p e si sn o n -n e g a t i v e .
Proposition 3 is also related to Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) .
As i g n i ficant difference is that here the distributions are not required to be 12 See also Neeman (1999) for a related model that has been independently developed.
identical, even the supports can be different. In the application presented in the next section it is important to allow different distributions, since there the distributions are determined endogenously. Moreover, Proposition 3 is related to McAfee (1991) . However, there only ex ante budget balance is required (i.e., there is a third party acting as budget balancer), and the ex post efficient trade decision q * must be characterized by a first order condition, which here (and in Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983) is not the case.
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3 An application to the hold-up problem
The hold-up problem has received considerable attention in the contract theoretic literature in recent years. A hold-up problem occurs if prior to a trade decision, the gains from trade can be enhanced by relationship specifici nvestments. As has been pointed out in the introduction, there are several recent papers that show for the case of observable valuations that the first best may not only be achieved by sophisticated contracts, but also by simple contracts when they are renegotiated in a certain way. It has been shown by Konakayama, Mitsui and Watanabe (1986) , Rogerson (1992) and Hermalin and Katz (1993) that comprehensive contracts can even implement the first best if the parties' valuations are private information. Hence, it is an interesting question to ask whether in this case it is also possible to achieve the first best with simple unconditional contracts which are renegotiated.
Assume firstthattherearenoinvestmentstobemade. F romProposition 3itisknownthatthepartiescanwriteasimplecontractthatjustspecifies an 13 See also McAfee and Reny (1992) , who show that ex post efficiency may be achieved if the buyer's valuation and the seller's costs are correlated, provided that there is a third party acting as budget breaker.
unconditional trade level q 0 , such that negotiations starting after the buyer and the seller have learned their types can lead to ex post efficiency. One can think of these negotiations as if a mechanism were proposed by a third party that aims to achieve ex post efficiency. 14 While some technical work is needed in order to make this precise, it is not difficult to see that under the assumption that renegotiation leads to ex post efficiency (when possible), also the right investment incentives are provided, given that a party's investment only influences his or her own type. 15 Intuitively, the reason is that a party's ex ante expected utility from an ex post efficient mechanism is (up to a constant) equal to the total expected surplus, so that each party is residual claimant on the margin from his or her point of view.
To be precise, consider the following situation. A buyer and a seller write as i m p l ec o n t r a c ta td a t e0 ,t h a tm e r e l ys p e c i fies an unconditional level of It has been pointed out by Tirole (1992 Tirole ( , 1994 ) that renegotiation is a particular form of collusion, since renegotiation can be viewed as collusion among future incarnations of agents against their current incarnations. Renegotiation here is modelled in the same way as collusion under private information is now usually being modelled, namely by employing an uninformed third party as mechanism designer (see Laffont and Martimort, 1997 , and Laffont and Rochet, 1997 . 15 Hence, investments are 'selfish' in the sense of Che and Hausch (1999) .
seller, respectively. At date 3, the initial contract may be renegotiated. Fin a l l y ,t r a d ec a noc c u ra n dp a y m e n t sc a nbem a d ea td a t e4 .
Let C i (e i ) denote party i's cost function for the investment. Let q ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability (or level) of trade and t 2 ≡−t 1 the (possibly negative) net payment of the buyer to the seller. The utilities of the buyer and the seller after date 4 are given by
At date 0 the parties want to design a contract which implements the ex post efficient trade decision
as well as the ex ante efficient investment levels:
Definition 4 The ex ante efficient investment levels e * 1 and e * 2 are given by
For simplicity it is assumed that the ex ante efficient investment levels e * 1 and e * 2 are uniquely determined. Let
In order to model the renegotiation game at date 3, it is assumed that a mediator who is interested in achieving ex post efficiency proposes a direct mechanism [q(ṽ),t(ṽ)] . The parties can either accept or reject this mechanism. If at least one party does not accept the renegotiation mechanism, the original contract remains valid; i.e., the default decision q 0 is implemented.
Otherwise the parties announce their valuations and then the decision and transfer payments are determined by the renegotiation mechanism.
Is a yt h a t" t h efirst best c a nb ea c h i e v e dw i t has i m p l ec o n t r a c ta n d renegotiation" if there exists a default decision q 0 and a mechanism [q(v),t(v)]
which yields the ex post efficient decision q * (v) and induces the parties to choose the ex ante efficient investment levels e * 1 and e * 2 . The following lemma says that in an incentive compatible and ex post efficient mechanism, agent i's interim expected utility equals the total expected surplus plus or minus a constant which does not depend on his or her type.
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In the lemma it is assumed that each agent believes that the other agent has invested efficiently, so that E −i is the expectation operator associated with the distribution function F −i and T i (ṽ i ) is defin e da si nS e c t i o n2 .
Lemma 3 A renegotiation mechanism [q(v),t(v)] is Bayesian incentive compatible and ex post efficient if and only if q(v)=q
* (v) and ∀i, ∀v, ∀ṽ i :
This lemma can now be used in order to show that indeed an ex post efficient and incentive compatible renegotiation mechanism induces the right investment incentives.
Lemma 4 Let [q * (v),t(v)] be a renegotiation mechanism such that (5) is satisfied. Then the agents are induced to choose the ex ante efficient investment levels e *
1 and e * 2 .
Intuitively, in a Bayesian incentive compatible and ex post efficient mechanism, each agent is residual claimant from his or her point of view. Hence, it is in the interest of each agent not only to tell the truth, but also to invest efficiently. This is true since an agent's investment only influences his or her own type, and not the type of other agents (cf. Rogerson, 1992) . It is now possible to state the following result.
16 See D'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979) .
Proposition 4 The first best can be achieved with a simple contract and renegotiation.
Two remarks have to be made. First, the fact that there exists a bargaini n gg a m es u c ht h a tt h efirst best is achieved does not guarantee that in real life contractual parties will actually always play this particular game. The mechanism design approach taken in this paper only allows to look for an up- Second, it is not claimed that the renegotiation mechanism is in itself 'renegotiation-proof' with respect to further negotiations. Assume that a party refuses to participate in the renegotiation mechanism proposed by the third party. Then the original contract would remain valid. Since q 0 ∈ (0, 1)
is ex post inefficient with probability 1, one could imagine that this would not be the end of the game. However, this is a general problem of models in which renegotiation is modelled as a non-cooperative game, even if there is no private information. For example, renegotiation is often modelled so that one of the two contractual parties can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other party. 18 However, the "or-leave-it" threat is usually inefficient. Hardly 17 Cf. also Dewatripont and Maskin (1990) and the literature cited there.
18 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) or Ma (1994) . Hart (1995, p. 77) considers the case in which each party can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer with probability valuations. In order to prove their well-known inefficiency result, Hart and Moore (1988) implicitly assume that no trade (q 0 =0 )is the only possible default decision. In a modification of their model, Rey (1990, 1994) explicitly allow randomization (0 <q 0 < 1)a sd e f a u l t 19 Cf. Proposition 1 in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1992) .
20 Using a simple model with uniform distributions and no investments, Schmitz (1998) discusses a coalition contract between two political parties in Germany which specifies randomization in case of disagreement.
decision and show that then the first best can be achieved. 21 While in these models an intermediate value of q 0 serves to adjust the threat point in a Nash bargaining game, in the present model an intermediate value of q 0 is advantageous because it relaxes the interim participation constraints (cf.
Section 2). In any case, as has been pointed out by Edlin and Reichelstein (1996, p. 494) , a contract to tra d eh a l fat a b l em i g h tw e l lb ee fficient, even though it is only efficient ex post to trade a whole table or nothing.
The paper suggests several interesting avenues for future research. First, Section 2 has illustrated that default decisions are relevant even if there are no investments. Indeed, it has been pointed out by Hart (1995) and Moore (1992) that the hold-up problem is only one vehicle for their theory of property rights. Given private information, one may analyze the effects of different ownership structures (control rights over q)a n dt r yt or e l a t e them to insights gained in models with investment decisions but observable valuations. Second, it has been assumed that agent i's investment only influences his or her own valuation v i . In the case of observable valuations, Che and Hausch (1999) Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) argue that the first best can be achieved in Rogerson's (1984) model. While Rogerson (1984) considered deterministic default decisions only, Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) allow the initial contract to specify trade with a certain probability. 22 In a first attempt to address this question, Schmitz (2002) shows that in this case there is in general no hope to achieve the first best, even if comprehensive contracts can be written and renegotiation can be ruled out. with incomplete information (see Myerson, 1984) or by exogenously given non-cooperative bargaining games.
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23 See also Farrell and Gibbons (1995) . Note, however, that their focus is on adverse selection (precontractual information at the ex ante stage) and not on hidden information (private information at the ex post bargaining stage).
Appendix
A1. Proof of Lemma 1.
(i) "Only if": (1) implies
(ii) "If": Using the condition of the lemma, the definition of U i (ṽ i ), and partial integration one finds
where the inequality follows since Q i (v i ) is non-decreasing. Hence, (1) is satisfied.
A2. Proof of Lemma 2.
Note that interim individual rationality is satisfied whenever U i (v i ) − q 0 v i is non-negative for all i and all v i . A c c o r d i n gt oL e m m a1 ,t h efirst derivative 
Rearranging and using the definitions of U i (v i ),o n efinds
Summing over all i and using
According to Lemma 2, interim individual rationality implies that this expression must not be smaller than
The goal is to construct a transfer scheme t(v) such that [q(v), t(v)] is a Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism.
Thus,
so that Bayesian incentive compatibility is satisfied by Lemma 1. Finally, notice that
where the last line follows from partial integration. Hence,
which by assumption is non-negative, yielding interim individual rationality.
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A4. Proof of Proposition 2.
It is obvious that ex post efficiency can be achieved if trade is always efficient (a = a i ≥ 0) or if trade is never efficient (b = b i ≤ 0). Consider hence the non-trivial case a<0 <b .Let Q i (v i )=E −i (q * (v)) and note that
Thus, the worst-off types are given by v 0 i =0∀i. Using partial integration, the left hand side of (3) can be 24 Note that the special case of Proposition 1 which refers only to the ex post efficient decision rule could alternatively be derived following the approach of Makowski and Mezzetti (1994) and Williams (1994) .
written as
It is straightforward to verify that this sum is not smaller than
is non-decreasing and a<0 <b.
A5. Proof of Proposition 3.
Consider the case a 1 + a 2 < 0 and b 1 + b 2 > 0 (otherwise it is obvious that the fir s tb e s tc a nb ea c h i e v e d ) . N o t et h a tF 1 (v 1 ) is strictly increasing
and b 1 > −b 2 , a simple intermediate value argument shows that a uniquê
Itwillno wbesho wnthatthereexistsanexpostefficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism which is interim individually rational given the default decision q 0 . Referring to Proposition 1, it has to be shown that the following expression is non-negative: 
A6. Proof of Lemma 3.
( i )" I f" : I th a st obes h o w nt h a t∀v i ,ṽ i :
( i i )" O n l yi f " : I th a sb e e ns h o w ni nL e m m a1t h a ti ne v e r yB a y e s i a n incentive compatible mechanism U i (v i ) − U i (ṽ i ) and hence T i (v i ) − T i (ṽ i ) is uniquely determined by the decision rule. Since [q * (v),t(v)] with T i (v i ) − T i (ṽ i ) determined by (5) is Bayesian incentive compatible, this implies that every Bayesian incentive compatible and ex post efficient mechanism must satisfy (5).
A7. Proof of Lemma 4.
Suppose that agent i believes that agent −i has invested efficiently and tells t h et r u t h . I ti sa l r e a d yk n o w nf r o mL e m m a3t h a ti ti sr a t i o n a lf o ra g e n ti
to also tell the truth. The ex ante expected utility of agent i provided that he or she invests e i thus reads
T h el a s tt w ot e r m sd on o td e p e n do ne i . Hence, agent i chooses e i in order to maximize
so that he or she will invest efficiently.
A8. Proof of Proposition 4.
This follows immediately from Proposition 3 and Lemma 4.
